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Contract as Emergency Law
Xuan-Thao Nguyen†
Abstract: This Article offers a new perspective of contract law as
emergency law. Doctrines of impossibility, supervening events, force majeure,
and good faith performance are core principles resiliently allowing parties to
address contract nonperformance under state of emergency crises.
Comparatively, China prefers drastic measures to confront contract
nonperformance problems by issuing Certificates of Force Majeure, permitting
Chinese companies to escape contract liability and forfeiting the resiliency of
contract law as emergency law. The Article argues that the pandemic reaffirms
the role of contract law as emergency law and urges governments to solidify the
freedom to contract.
Cite as: Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Contract as Emergency Law, 30 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 420 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 brought a state of emergency to the United
States and the world. President Donald Trump signed several
Executive Orders. At the state level, governors issued their
Executive Orders to respond to the emergency.1 Legislatively,
Congress addressed the COVID-19 pandemic by passing financial
packages to rescue the economy from precipitous freefall. For
instance, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act
†

Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law, Director of the Center for Intellectual Property
& Innovation, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. Special thanks to Michelle
Swinney and Malissa Magiera for their valuable assistance. Thank you to my Chinese
students for their research assistance. I dedicate the series of law review articles on
Contracts and COVID-19 to my 1L students at the University of Washington School of
Law and Indiana University McKinney School of Law.
1
See Benjamin Della Rocca et al., State Emergency Authorities to Address
COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/stateemergency-authorities-address-COVID-19 (providing state by state analysis of emergency
laws and responses); COVID-19 Emergency Powers and Constitutional Limits, AKIN
GUMP (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/COVID-19emergency-powers-and-constitutional-limits.html (identifying federal authority, state
authority, and various constitutional limits on due process and the takings clause when
governments force a business to close, commandeer a business or factory, or confiscate a
private property); see also ANNA PRICE & LOUIS MYERS, LIBR. OF CONG., UNITED STATES:
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COVID-19 (2020),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/COVID-19-responses/federal-state-local-responses.pdf
(detailing the various responses from governments).
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(CARES Act) enacted on March 27, 2020, protects renters in low
income housing properties and tenants in units and buildings
receiving federally backed mortgages from evictions.2 The federal
moratorium lasted 120 days until August 23, 2020, and was later
extended to June 30, 2021.3 Cities and local governments also
extended protection to renters through emergency orders and
ordinances.4 Of the emergency laws invoked, none addressed the
millions of cases concerning contract nonperformance due to the
government shutdown, shelter-in-place, and social distancing
orders by governors in forty-three states.5 As infection and death
tolls continued to rise, businesses closed, and the economy
faltered, parties in contractual agreements faced an unprecedented
crisis. These parties could not perform their obligations, which
may cause them to breach their contracts and face substantial
damages.
This Article offers a critique of state of emergency laws
exposing how they are inadequate in ameliorating the massive
contract nonperformance problems.6 The Article turns to
See Ann O’Connell, Emergency Bans on Evictions and Other Tenant
Protections Related to Coronavirus, NOLO (last updated Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.no
lo.com/evictions-ban (stating that the CDC’s Agency Orders extends the residential
eviction ban until at least March 31, 2021); Emma Platoff & Juan Pablo Garnham, Eviction
Proceedings and Debt Collections Can Resume This Month, Texas Supreme Court Order
s, TEX. TRIB. (May 14, 2020, 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/14/texasevictions-debt-collections-resume-may-moratoriums-lifted/ (discussing the federal
moratorium does not apply to tenants who do not reside in buildings with federally backed
mortgages and that they will face evictions starting May 26).
3
See id.
4
Protections for Texas Renters: COVID-19, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF
LAW, https://sites.utexas.edu/covid19relief/tenant-protections/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021)
(listing cities with emergency orders and emergency ordinances to assist renters).
5
See Rachel Holliday Smith, Debt Collectors Freeze Funds of New Yorkers
Struggling in Pandemic, CITY (May 1, 2020, 11:53 PM), https://thecity.nyc/2020/05/debtcollectors-freeze-funds-of-struggling-new-yorkers.html.
6
As a nation, we are conditioned to think of emergencies as they related to
national security and natural disasters crises. See, e.g., J. Benton Heath, The New National
Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE L. J. 1020 (2020); Mark P. Nevitt,
On Environmental Law, Climate Change, & National Security Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 321 (2020); Elizabeth Trujillo, An Introduction to Trade and National Security: New
Concepts of National Security in a Time of Economic Uncertainty, 30 DUKE J. COMPAR. &
2
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normative contract laws’ doctrines of impossibility, supervening
events, frustration of purpose, force majeure, and duty to perform
in good faith, as evidence of how contract law functions as
emergency law. The resilience of contract law doctrines, however,
in the face of a pandemic, may be insufficient. The Article looks
beyond the U.S. border for a radical response implemented by
China for further insights.
In response to the state of emergency, China adopted a
novel approach to address the private contracts’ problem.7 The
government declared, upon an application by the contracting party
for force majeure certificate, that contract performance is excused
as impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the
nonperforming party is not in breach and can escape damages. As
China is the center of the global supply chain, thousands of
companies execute contractual agreements with international
partners worldwide. Instead of allowing parties to adhere to
private business ordering to decide for themselves or avail to the
judicial system for recourse in breach of contract disputes, China’s
emergency approach allowed companies to invoke 5,600 contracts
with a total value of $72.47 billion.8
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses
emergency laws’ framework and specific emergency laws
invoked during the COVID-19 pandemic. Part II focuses on
contract problems under the state of emergency caused by the
pandemic. Part III explains contract law doctrines that solve
arising problems during the state of emergency. Part IV examines
and critiques the Chinese government’s approach to uphold
thousands of contracts in the international supply chain network.
The Article concludes with observations for future contracts to
adequately address pandemic-related supervening events that
would wreak havoc to the daily functions of a normal economy.
INT’L L. 211 (2020); Craig Martin, Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis
and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 331 (2020); Amy L. Stein, A
Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183 (2018).
7
China Force Majeure Certificate Issuance Pass 5,600 Amid Virus Outbreak Trade Body, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/healthcoronavirus-china-forcemajeure/china-force-majeure-certificate-issuance-pass-5600amid-virus-outbreak-trade-body-idUSL4N2B43CK.
8
See id.
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I. EMERGENCY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Emergency laws are legislation referring to a state of
emergency empowering governments to take actions or impose
policies that governments ordinarily would not be authorized to
implement.9 That means exigent circumstances must be present
for governments to declare a state of emergency. Upon the
declaration, governments can invoke specific powers in response
to the multiple crises stemming from an emergency.10
A. Emergency Law Framework
Circumstances that necessitate a government to declare a
state of emergency generally include natural disasters, civil
unrests, armed conflicts, and medical or public health crises.11
With respect to the legal framework for the declaration, there are
three different ways the federal government can declare a state of

9

In the words of Justice Pound, concurred by Justice Cardozo, emergency laws
are always present. See People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 130 N.E. 601, 606
(N.Y. 1921) (“Emergency laws in time of peace are uncommon but not unknown.
Wholesale disaster, financial panic, the aftermath of war, earthquake, pestilence, famine,
and fire, a combination of men or the force of circumstances may, as the alternative of
confusion or chaos, demand the enactment of laws that would be thought arbitrary under
normal conditions. Although emergency cannot become the source of power, and although
the Constitution cannot be suspended in any complication of peace or war, an emergency
may afford a reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already enjoyed but not
previously exercised.”).
10
Scholars often discuss national security crisis and abrogation of civil liberties
when governments invoke specific powers to response to emergencies. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies,
56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed
Doors: The First Amendment and ‘Special Interest’ Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 741,
741 (2003) (“The strength of this country's commitment to civil liberties is most often
tested in times of war or other national emergencies.”); David Greenberg, Lincoln's
Crackdown, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2001, 11:58 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2059132
(detailing Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus).
11
A federal court has defined a state of emergency as “the condition that exists
whenever, during times of public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public
emergency, public safety authorities are unable to maintain public order or afford adequate
protection for lives or property, or whenever the occurrence of any such condition is
imminent.” United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir. 1971).
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emergency.12
First, the President possesses the authority to declare a
national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA).13
The NEA imposes procedural requirements on the President to
declare a national emergency.14 Congress can limit the President’s
emergency authority if it gathers necessary votes to overturn a
veto. For example, on February 15, 2019, President Trump
invoked the NEA to issue Proclamation 9844 which declares a
“National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States.”15 Both the House and the Senate voted to overturn
the President’s declaration but failed to obtain sufficient votes to
override the veto.16
Second, the Secretary of Health & Human Services
(HHS) possesses the power to declare a national public health
emergency. The Public Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §247d, empowers
the HHS Secretary with that authority. The Secretary may
determine that “a disease or disorder presents a public health
emergency” or “a public health emergency, including significant
12
There is another legal framework for the President to declare a national
emergency pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1) (“(A)n unforeseen emergency exists which
requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international organization;
and (B) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the authority of the Arms Export
Control Act [22 U.S.C §§ 2751 et seq.] or any other law except this section.”). For purposes
of this Article, only three emergency frameworks are in discussion. See also James G.
Hodge, Jr., & Kim Weidenaar, Public Health Emergencies as Threats to National Security,
9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 81, 82–83 (2017) (identifying relevant laws authorizing
the President to declare a state of emergency and the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services to declare a national public health emergency).
13
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51.
14
50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (“With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the
exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power,
the President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall
immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 847 (2006) (“The National
Emergencies Act is the blanket statute that covers a myriad of separate grants of
congressional power to the President to be used when he deems there is an emergency.”).
15
Geoffrey A. Manne & Seth Weinberger, Trust the Process: How the National
Emergency Act Threatens Marginalized Populations and the Constitution—and What to
Do About It, 44 HARBINGER 95, 95 (2020).
16
See id. (noting “the emergency remains in place” as Congress failed to override
the veto).
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outbreaks of infectious disease or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise
exists.”17 In addition, instead of being the first to declare a public
health emergency, the Secretary could follow a presidential memo
instructing the Secretary to declare a national public health
emergency or a presidential proclamation declaring a national
emergency with respect to a national public health crisis. For
example, the “President Memo Combatting the National Drug
Demand and Opioid Crisis” that was released on October 26, 2017
instructed the HHS Secretary to declare a public health emergency
to combat the opioid crisis.18 Likewise, the Presidential
Proclamation 8443 declared a national emergency with respect to
the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic on October 23, 2009.19 Upon the
declaration of a national public health emergency, the Secretary
can make grants; provide awards for expenses; enter into
contracts; and conduct and support investigations into the cause,
treatment, or prevention of the disease.20 The Secretary can also
waive or modify requirements during the emergency.21
Lastly, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief &
Emergency Assistance Act enables a governor to petition the
President for a declaration of a major disaster or emergency.22 A
17
42 U.S.C. § 247d; See also Public Health Emergency Declarations,
DEPARTMENT OF HEATH & HUMAN SERVICES, (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.phe.gov/em
ergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx (listing all Public Health Emergency
Declarations).
18
A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guideemergency-powers-and-their-use.
19
Proclamation 8443–Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect to the
2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2009),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-8443-declaration-nationalemergency-with-respect-the-2009-h1n1-influenza.
20
See id.
21
Waiver or Modification of Requirements Under Section 1135 of the Social
Security Act, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Oct. 27, 2009),
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/section1135/Documents/1135Waive
rSigned_H1N1.pdf
22
42 U.S.C. § 5170. The Act’s predecessors were both known as the “Disaster
Relief Act,” enacted in 1950 and 1974. The framework under the Stafford Act allows state
and federal government to address bio attacks and other disasters. See Barry Kellman,
Responding to Biological Attacks, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 11 (2018) (stating
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governor submits such a petition upon a finding that a “disaster is
of such severity and magnitude that an effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local
governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.”23
Presidents have declared national emergencies under this Act
upon governors’ requests on an average of nine times per year.24
Each of these tools are options for the federal government
to take swift action during emergencies. Absent these laws,
responses to emergencies would likely be insufficient to address
the situations.

that responses to bio-attacks and other catastrophe are “part of the normal National
Response Framework.”).
23
42 U.S.C. § 5170. 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (defining an emergency under this chapter
as "any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe in any part of the United States.”). Also, a major disaster under this chapter is
defined as "any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water,
wind driven [sic] water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide,
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in
any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter
to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster
relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby”
Id. Illustratively, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 caused Louisiana governor Kathleen Blanco
to request that President Bush to declare a federal state of emergency for Louisiana,
activating federal assistance and federal troops to rescue people and protect property.
Mitchell F. Crusto, State of Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L.
REV. 471, 482 (2015); see Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, Flint of Outrage,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 168–69 (2017) (stating that in response to the Flint’s
contaminated water crisis, on January 14, 2016, Governor Rick Snyder “declared a state of
emergency and requested federal aid. On January 16, 2016, President Barack Obama
declared a state of national emergency in Flint. On January 21, 2016, the EPA issued an
Emergency Order pursuant to the SWDA compelling state officials to take specific steps
to assure the safety of the public water system.”).
24
A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guideemergency-powers-and-their-use; see Bruce R. Lindsay & Francis X. McCarthy, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R42702, STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS 1953-2014: TRENDS, ANALYSES,
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS 7 (2015).
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B. Emergency Law Invoked During COVID-19
During the early months of 2020, as COVID-19
tormented the nation by shutting down the economy, the HHS
Secretary first declared a national public health emergency under
the Public Health Act.25 The President then proclaimed a national
emergency and issued three executive orders pursuant to the NEA.
The first person documented with the COVID-19
infection in the United States occurred on January 20, 2020.26 The
viral contagion first detected in Wuhan, China, quickly
transmitted through symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals in
213 countries and territories around the world.27 The World Health
Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11,
2020.28 As the news reports on COVID-19 spreading and killing
infected individuals in Wuhan, governments in different countries
responded with different measures.29 In the United States, under
the emergency law framework, the HHS Secretary declared a
national public health emergency as the result of COVID-19 on

25
Press Release, Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United
States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/202
0/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novelcoronavirus.html.
26
See Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the
United States, 382 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 929 (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/f
ull/10.1056/NEJMoa2001191; Karen Weise et al., Why Washington State? How Did It
Start? Questions Answered on the U.S. Coronavirus Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020
), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/coronavirus-in-washington-state.html.
27
See generally Countries Where Covid-19 Has Spread, WORLDOMETER (Apr.
28, 2021), https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/countries-where-coronavirus-hasspread/ (as of June 14, 2021, the world witnessed 176,895,871 confirmed Covid-19 cases,
along with 3,822,394 deaths).
28
See Timeline: WHO’s Covid-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline
(last visited Feb. 27, 2021); Press Release, New ICD-10-CM Code for the 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (COVID-19), Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd/Announcement-New-ICD-code-for-coronavirus-3-182020.pdf.
29
See Helen Regan et al., January 29 Coronavirus News, CNN (Jan. 29, 2020,
11:44 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/asia/live-news/coronavirus-outbreak-01-29-20-intlhnk/index.html (explaining how Japan, Malaysia, China, and South Korea addressed the
spread of Covid-19 in the early months).
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January 31, 2020.30
The HHS Secretary subsequently renewed the national
public health emergency declaration on April 21, 2020.31 The last
time the HHS Secretary made a similar declaration due to a viral
outbreak was during the H1N1 pandemic.32 Upon declaration, the
HHS Secretary may waive or modify the application of health care
items and services furnished by health care providers,
certifications, licensure requirements, sanctions, and other
provisions as necessary to supply public health services during the
emergency period.33
By March 13, 2020, COVID-19’s devastation in the
United States required a new response: President Trump issued
Proclamation 9994, which declared a national emergency
30

See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Determination that a Public
Health Emergency Exists, (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healtha
ctions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx (“As a result of confirmed cases of 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), on this date and after consultation with public health officials
as necessary, I, Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the
authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby
determine that a public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020,
nationwide.”). President Trump, on March 18, 2020, issued Executive Order 13,909 to
delegate the HHS Secretary the prioritization and allocation authority under section 101 of
the Act with respect to health and medical resources needed to respond to the spread of
COVID-19. See Exec. Order No.13,909, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,227 (Mar. 18, 2020). On March
23, 2020, Trump signed Executive Order 13,910 to delegate to the HHS Secretary the
authority to prevent hoarding of health and medical resources necessary to respond to the
spread of COVID-19 within the United States. See Exec. Order No. 13,910, 85 Fed. Reg.
17,001 (Mar. 23, 2020).
31
See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Renewal of Determination that a
Public Health Emergency Exists, (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/phe/Pages/covid19-21apr2020.aspx (“As a result of the continued
consequences of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (formerly called 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)) pandemic, on this date and after consultation with public health
officials as necessary, I, Alex M. Azar II, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
pursuant to the authority vested in me under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act,
do hereby renew, effective April 26, 2020, my January 31, 2020, determination that a
public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27, 2020, nationwide.”).
32
On April 26, 2009, HHS Secretary declared a public health emergency under
section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 247d, in response to the 2009
H1N1 influenza virus. The Secretary then renewed that declaration twice, on July 24, 2009,
and October 1, 2009.
33
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5.
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retroactively as of March 1, 2020.34 Generally, most presidential
proclamations are aimed at those outside the government
containing neither force nor effect of law because they are merely
ceremonial in nature.35 However, with the proclamation to declare
a national emergency, the President may authorize the Secretary
of the Treasury to prescribe, “the importation free of duty of food,
clothing, and medical, surgical, and other supplies for use in
emergency relief work” under the Emergencies statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1318(a).36 Under the Emergencies statute, the Treasury
Secretary is further authorized to eliminate, consolidate, or
relocate port of entry, or take any other action that may be
necessary to respond to a specific threat.37 Also, the statute
authorizes the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to close ports of entry as necessary to “respond to the
34
Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (invoked in
response to the spread of the novel coronavirus). See Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 458
F.Supp.3d 1226, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (including Proclamation No. 9994 along with
state and local governments’ “stay home” orders).
35
Executive Order, Proclamation, or Executive Memorandum?, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://guides.loc.gov/executive-orders/order-proclamation-memorandum (last visited
Feb. 27, 2021).
36
See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(a).
37
See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (providing that “. . . the Secretary of the Treasury,
when necessary to respond to a national emergency declared under the National
Emergencies Act . . . or to a specific threat to human life or national interests” is authorized
to take additional actions on a temporary basis. Secretary of the Treasury may eliminate,
consolidate, or relocate any office or port of entry of the Customs Service; modify hours
of service, alter services rendered at any location, or reduce the number of employees at
any location; or take any other action that may be necessary to respond directly to the
national emergency or specific threat. Id. The Treasury Secretary works in consultation
with the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security who then limited travel to prevent
the spread of Covid-19. See Exec. Order No. 13,916, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 23, 2020)
(the Treasury “Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security or his
designee before exercising, as invoked and made available under this order, any of the
authority set forth in section 1318(a) of title 19, United States Code.”). The Secretary of
Homeland Security later extended the travel limitations until May 20, 2020. See
Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and
Ferries Service Between the United States and Canada, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,059 (May 22,
2020). For the Travel Restrictions between the United States and Mexico due to Covid-19,
see Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and
Ferries Service Between the United States and Mexico, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,547 (Mar. 20,
2020).
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specific threat to human life or national interests.”38 Indeed, the
Department of Homeland Security invoked the Emergencies
statute to limit travels at the U.S. land ports of entry with Canada
and Mexico, in response to the spread of the novel coronavirus.39
After the proclamation of COVID-19 as a national
emergency, on March 27, 2020, President Trump signed
Executive Orders 13,911 and 13,912, invoking his authority under
the National Emergencies Act.40 In Executive Order 13,911, the
President delegated “additional authority” under the Defense
Production Act with respect to health and medical resources, such
as personal protective equipment and ventilators, to respond to the
COVID-19 spread. Specifically, President Trump delegated the
authority “to guarantee loans by private institutions, make loans,
make provision for purchases and commitments to purchase, and
take additional actions to create, maintain, protect, expand, and
restore domestic industrial based capabilities to produce such
resources.”41 Further, the President delegated the authority “to
enable greater cooperation among private businesses in expanding
production of and distributing such resources . . . and to provide
for the making of voluntary agreements and plans of action by the
private sector.”42
For Executive Order 13,912, President Trump invoked a
national emergency authority to order the “Selected Reserve and
Certain Members of the Individual Ready Reserve of the Armed
Forces” to active duty in response to the spread of the novel

38

See 19 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2).
On March 18, 2020, the U.S. and Canadian governments announced the closure
of the international border to nonessential travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See
Notification of Temporary Travel Restrictions Applicable to Land Ports of Entry and
Ferries Service Between the United States and Mexico, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,547 (Mar. 20,
2020). In the announcement of the border closure, the Department of Homeland Security
noted that, consistent with the President’s declaration of a national emergency, the spread
of COVID-19 within the U.S. posed a “specific threat to human life or national interests,”
justifying the travel restrictions under 19 U.S.C. § 1318. Only essential travels are
permitted. Id.
40
See Exec. Order No. 13,911, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,403 (Mar. 27, 2020). See also
Exec. Order No. 13,912, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,407 (Mar. 27, 2020).
41
Exec. Order No. 13,911, 85 Fed. Reg. 18,403.
42
Id.
39
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coronavirus.43 Also, on April 18, 2020, the President issued
Executive Order 13,916 to invoke a national emergency in
providing additional authority to the Secretary of the Treasury in
response to COVID-19.44 Under this executive order, the Treasury
Secretary possesses the authority to “temporarily extend
deadlines” for certain estimated payments that importers were
“suffering significant financial hardship because of COVID-19.”45
According to the Temporary Final Rule issued by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection and the Department of Treasury, importers
with significant financial hardships relating to merchandise
entered into the United States between March-April 2020, could
postpone their payments for duties, taxes, or fees.46
In summary, at the U.S. national level, in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic disrupting the nation and causing a
shutdown of the economy, the President proclaimed a national
emergency and issued three executive orders pursuant to the NEA.
The President’s declaration and executive orders came after the
HHS Secretary declared a national public health emergency.
At the state level, as of April 6, 2020, governors in fortythree states issued executive orders to direct stay-at-home or
shelter-in-place for all with few exemptions.47 About 300 million
Americans, or more than 90% of the total population, were given
orders to stay indoors.48 The exemptions covered grocery
shopping, limited outdoor exercise, and a narrow list of essential
jobs. Consequently, the entire country abruptly came to a grinding
halt.
The breadth of executive action demonstrates how serious
43

See 85 Fed. Reg. 18,407.
See 85 Fed. Reg. 22,951.
45
Id.
46
See Temporary Postponement of the Time to Deposit Certain Estimated Duties,
Taxes, and Fees During the National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,349; see also Richard Newcomb et al., US Takes
Action to Abate Tariffs and Duties in Wake of COVID-19, DLA PIPER (May 8, 2020),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/05/us-takes-action-to-abatetariffs-and-duties-in-wake-of-covid-19/.
47
See
Jason
Silverstein, 43 States Now Have Stay-at-Home Orders for
Coronavirus. These Are the 7 That Don’t, CBS NEWS (Apr. 6, 2020, 7:30 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/stay-at-home-orders-states/.
48
Id.
44
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unprecedented COVID-19 was. A federalist society centralizing
power in this way exemplifies the unprecedented nature that
COVID-19 presented. However, none of these executive orders
addressed what was to come of pre-existing contracts.
II. CONTRACT PROBLEMS UNDER THE STATE OF EMERGENCY
COVID-19 upended the United States and the rest of the
world. As of February 25, 2021, more than 500,000 Americans
died of COVID-19 since February of 2020, when the first US
recorded death occurred.49 The contagious virus infected more
than 28 million people in the United States.50 As businesses either
remained shut down or struggled to reopen, unemployment filings
reached over 40 million in March 2020.51 Outside the United
States, the viral contagion wreaked havoc worldwide and forced
businesses into deep uncertainty. A United Nations study found
that “81% of the world workforce of 3.3 billion people
experienced their place of work fully or partly closed because of
49

See COVID-19 Tracker, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2021); see also Thomas Fuller & Mike Baker, Coronavirus Death in California
Came Weeks Before First Known U.S. Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-first-united-states-death.html.
50
See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 49; see also
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2021, 2:36
P.M.), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html.
Worldwide, more than 13 million people are infected by Covid-19 as of July 14, 2020,
reflecting an increase of 10 million people since April 2020. See also Pablo Gutiérrez et
al., Covid World Map: Which Countries Have the Most Coronavirus Cases and Deaths?,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/25/covidworld-map-which-countries-have-the-most-coronavirus-vaccinations-cases-and-deaths;
Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 458 F.Supp.3d 1226, 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (noting that at the
end of April 2020 COVID-19 “has so far infected more than 3 million people globally and
has killed more than 208,000. COVID-19 is ten times deadlier than a severe seasonal
influenza.”).
51
See Patricia Cohen, ‘Still Catching Up’: Jobless Numbers May Not Tell Full
Story, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/business/econom
y/coronavirus-unemployment-claims.html (stating that more than 40 million people or one
out of every four American workers have filed for unemployment benefits); Patricia Cohen,
Many Jobs May Vanish Forever as Layoffs Mount, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/business/economy/coronavirus-unemploymentclaims.html (reporting 38.6 million Americans are without employment in May 2020 and
42% of those jobs may not return).
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the outbreak.”52 The pandemic caused unparalleled decline in
many sectors of the economy.53 The pandemic’s impact, as
predicted by experts, will lead to “permanent shifts in political and
economic power in ways that will become apparent only later.”54
As the United States joined other nations to flatten and
control the curve of infection and death caused by COVID-19, the
economy came to a sudden halt.55 Consequently, contract
52

See Coronavirus: Worst Economic Crisis Since 1930s Depression, IMF Says,
BBC (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52236936.
53
See Sam Meredith, IEA Says the Coronavirus Crisis Has Set in Motion the
Largest Drop of Global Energy Investment in History, CNBC (May 27, 2020, 9:24 AM ),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/coronavirus-iea-expects-historic-fall-in-globalenergy-investment.html (“The International Energy Agency believes the coronavirus
pandemic has paved the way for the largest decline of global energy investment in history,
with spending set to plummet in every major sector this year.”); Yen Nee Lee, Global
Economy May Not Fully Recover from the Coronavirus Crisis by 2021, IMF Chief
Economist Says, CNBC (Apr. 17, 2020, 12:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/17/c
oronavirus-global-economy-may-not-recover-fully-by-2021-imf-says.html; Sergei
Klebnikov, IMF Warns Coronavirus Will Hurt Global Economy ‘Way Worse’ Than 2008
Financial Crisis, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeikl
ebnikov/2020/04/03/imf-warns-coronavirus-will-hurt-global-economy-way-worse-than2008-financial-crisis/#15f8251f707e.
54
See John R. Allen et al., How the World Will Look After the Coronavirus
Pandemic, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 20, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/worldorder-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/.
55
Harry Stevens, Why Outbreaks like Coronavirus Spread Exponentially, and
How to “Flatten the Curve,” WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2020/world/corona-simulator/. Unfortunately, “the curve has come undone”
due to lack of national leadership. Opinion: Americans Sacrificed to Flatten the Curve.
Their Leaders Have Let Them Down., WASH. POST (June 30, 2020), https://www.washin
gtonpost.com/opinions/americans-sacrificed-to-flatten-the-curve-their-leaders-have-letthem-down/2020/06/30/4c442e72-baf0-11ea-8cf5-9c1b8d7f84c6_story.html (“The nation
still needs a federal response. The virus is relentless and opportunistic — but the response
has been patchwork and uneven. Unless that is fixed, we will be doomed to more suffering
and terrible losses still to come.”). Economically, the United States collapsed and suffered
a staggering loss. Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Monthly U.S. Budget Deficit Soared
to Record $864 Billion in June, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/20
20/07/13/us/politics/budget-deficit-coronavirus.html (reporting the U.S. budget deficit
grew to a record level “as the federal government pumped huge sums of money into the
economy to prop up workers and businesses affected by the coronavirus” and the increased
deficits are the “direct results of the economy’s swift collapse amid the pandemic.”); Annie
Lowrey, The Second Great Depression, THE ATLANTIC (June 23, 2020),
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problems escalated. The global supply chain management
suffered severely because the viral disruption was “not part of
supplier performance metrics” for many companies; therefore,
suppliers failed to provide solutions addressing the outbreak.56
The global supply chain disruption acutely affected local stores in
the United States, as shelves in stores sat empty, and customers
waited for arrival of shipments, production stoppages, shortages
of raw materials and semi-finished goods unfolded in China and
other countries.57
Meanwhile, due to government shelter-in-place orders,
the demands for supplies in many sectors drastically decreased,
devastating the supply chain ecosystem.58 For example, in the
automotive sector, “41 of the 44 auto assembly plants in the
United States closed” by March 26, 2020, propelling many
automotive suppliers into financial trouble, including “Aptiv, one
of the world’s largest automotive suppliers, announced that it
would draw down its entire $1.4 billion credit facility.”59 Another
example is the food supply chain, which was severely disrupted
by the pandemic, creating “shocks” to both supply and demand
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/second-great-depression/613360/
(“Three months ago, the pandemic and ensuing shelter-in-place orders caused mass job
loss unlike anything in recent American history. A virtual blizzard settled on top of the
country and froze everyone in place. Nearly 40 percent of low-wage workers lost their jobs
in March. More than 40 million people lost their jobs in March, April, or May.”).
56
See Thomas Y. Choi et al., Coronavirus Is a Wake-Up Call for Supply Chain
Management, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/coronavirusis-a-wake-up-call-for-supply-chain-management.
57
Coronavirus and Supply Chain Disruption: What Firms Can Learn,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 17, 2020), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/
veeraraghavan-supply-chain/ (“Long stretches of empty supermarket shelves and shortages
of essential supplies are only the visible impacts to consumers of the global supply chain
disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Unseen are the production stoppages in
locations across China and other countries and the shortages of raw materials, subassemblies and finished goods that make up the backstory of the impact.”); see also Adnan
Seric et al., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Apr. 27, 2020), Managing COVID-19: How the
Pandemic Disrupts Global Value Chains, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covi
d-19-pandemic-disrupts-global-value-chains/.
58
Tom Linton & Bindiya Vakil, It’s up to Manufacturers to Keep Their Suppliers
Afloat, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/its-up-to-manufacturersto-keep-their-suppliers-afloat.
59
See id.
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sides.60 Giant companies like Walmart that leverage sophisticated
algorithms, still struggled to manage their supply chains because
COVID-19 “ha[d] thrown off the digital program that helps them
predict how many diapers and garden hoses they need to keep on
the shelves.”61 In other words, the supply chain disruptions meant
parties could not perform in accordance to the terms of their
contracts because the agreement did not include provisions
anticipating the changes caused by COVID-19.62
At a more granular level, contract problems involving
individuals rose in staggering number. As students became
unhappy with online learning environments, they brought contract
class actions against public and private universities across the
country.63 Dentists, facing rapid losses in their practices because
60
See Ravi Anupindi, COVID-19 Shocks Food Supply Chain, Spurs Creativity
and Search for Resiliency, MICH. BUS. REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://news.umich.edu/cov
id-19-shocks-food-supply-chain-spurs-creativity-and-search-for-resiliency/ (discussing
how COVID-19 has created multiple shocks to these supply chains deemed “demand” and
“supply” shocks); see also Melissa Repko & Amelia Lucas, The Meat Supply Chain Is
Broken. Here’s Why Shortages Are Likely to Last During the Coronavirus Pandemic,
CNBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/heres-why-meat-shortages-arelikely-to-last-during-the-pandemic.html (identifying various pressures caused by Covid-19
on the meat supply chain in the United States that creates the meat shortages).
61
See Nicole Wetsman, The Algorithms Big Companies Use to Manage Their
Supply Chains Don’t Work During Pandemics, VERGE (Apr. 27, 2020, 1:25 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/27/21238229/algorithms-supply-chain-modelpandemic-disruption-amazon-walmart.
62
See generally Tiffany D. Presley & Jamal Abdulrasheed, Force Majeure:
Navigating Coronavirus Supply Chain Disruptions, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/force-majeure-navigating-coronavirus-supplychain-disruptions (providing an analysis of force majeure in supply chain contracts that
require buyers and supplier to determine: “1) what events constitute a force majeure event
under the contract, 2) should a qualifying event occur, does the provision totally relieve a
party of an obligation to perform a contractual obligation or merely suspend or delay of
performance until the conclusion of the force majeure event? 3) whether either or both
parties are required to mitigate losses, and 4) whether counterparty notice is required and
the form of such notice.”).
63
See Michelle G. Kurilla, Student Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Harvard
Following Coronavirus Closure, HARV. CRIMSON (May 22, 2020), https://www.thecrims
on.com/article/2020/5/22/harvard-coronavirus-class-action/ (the student’s class action
alleges that Harvard “provided inadequate education after sending students home due to
the COVID-19 outbreak”); Karen Sloan, 'Subpar in Every Aspect': Harvard Law Student
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patients were too afraid to visit dental offices for fear of
contracting the viral disease, sought to enforce insurance policy
contract terms to cover their losses by filing contract class actions
against insurance companies.64 Families of loved ones in nursing
homes suffered incalculable losses, felt the despair, and brought
torts and contract actions against nursing homes as death tolls in
those facilities constituted the largest segment of elderly people
negatively impacted by the disease.65 Employees, independent
contractors, speakers, airline passengers, cruise passengers,
festival ticketholders, among others, filed contract actions against

Sues Over Online Classes, LAW.COM (June 23, 2020, 3:08 PM),
https://www.law.com/2020/06/23/subpar-in-every-aspect-harvard-law-student-sues-overonline-classes/?slreturn=20200614161231 (noting that at least 100 universities have faced
lawsuits brought by students to seek tuition reimbursements amid the pandemic); Andrew
Keshner, At Least 100 Lawsuits Have Been Filed by Students Seeking College Refunds —
and They Open Some Thorny Questions, MARKETWATCH (May 22, 2020, 8:23 AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/unprecedented-lawsuits-from-students-suingcolleges-amid-the-coronavirus-outbreak-raise-3-thorny-questions-for-higher-education2020-05-21.
64
See Anne Bucher, Dental Clinic Class Action Lawsuit Filed Over Covid-19
Losses, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://ca.topclassactions.com/lawsuitsettlements/lawsuit-news/dental-clinic-class-action-lawsuit-filed-over-covid-19-losses/
(noting the class members “paid for business interruption insurance in the expectation that
the defendant would honour its contractual obligations in good faith if and when an
unforeseen and unintentional occurrence were to take place resulting in an interruption of
business”); Bill Rankin, Cobb Dentist Files Class-Action Suit over Lost Coronavirus
Business, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 9, 2020); https://www.ajc.com/news/local/cobbdentist-files-class-action-suit-over-lost-coronavirusbusiness/LdcgmYmpKQu1nxG6jRLJEM/; Erin Shaak, Dentist Claims Farmers, Foremost
Insurance Cos. Wrongfully Denied Business Interruption Claim Amid COVID-19,
CLASSACTION.ORG (June 16, 2020), https://www.classaction.org/news/dentist-claimsfarmers-foremost-insurance-cos-wrongfully-denied-business-interruption-claim-amidcovid-19.
65
See Matt Hamilton, Her Father Had COVID-19 for Weeks. The Nursing Home
Told Her the Day Before He Died, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2020, 5:00 A.M. P.T.),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-09/her-father-had-covid-19-for-weeksthe-nursing-home-told-her-the-night-before-he-died (chronicling the alleged conduct that
caused nursing home resident death and noting that 3,176 nursing home residents died of
Covid-19); Abigail Abrams, 'A License for Neglect.' Nursing Homes Are Seeking — and
Winning — Immunity Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, TIME (May 14, 2020, 2:40 P.M.
E.D.T.) (reporting on lawsuits brought against nursing homes “for neglect, abuse and
wrongful death” during the pandemic).
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businesses for canceling events, projects, flights, and cruises due
to COVID-19.66 In these suits, claimants asserted breach of
contract and unjust enrichment,67claiming that the businesses
failed to pay or failed to refund as promised.68
Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic rendered parties unable
to fulfill contracts.69 Lawsuits related to nonperformance,
suspension, breach, and damages in connection with COVID-19
are now entering court dockets across the United States.70 Parties
66

See Diana Fassbender et al., COVID-19 Class Action Lawsuits: Defending
Against Alleged Breach of Contract Over Decisions During Uncertain Times, LAW.COM
(Apr. 20, 2020, 4:31 P.M.), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2020/04/20/covid-19-classaction-lawsuits-defending-against-alleged-breach-of-contract-over-decisions-duringuncertain-times/ (identifying contract cases “have been filed against airlines for refund
claims arising out of flight cancellations; against ticket sellers and marketplaces for refunds
following cancelled events; against gyms and fitness facilities for the charging of monthly
membership fees while facilities are closed; and against universities and other facilities
providing room and board.”).
67
See COVID-19 Class Actions: Refund Disputes Rage Over Membership Fees
& Event Tickets, CROWELL MORING (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEve
nts/AlertsNewsletters/all/COVID-19-Class-Actions-Refund-Disputes-Rage-OverMembership-Fees-Event-Tickets.
68
See Bob Sechler, Coronavirus in Austin: SXSW Sued Over No-Refund Policy
After Cancellation, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Apr. 25, 2020),
https://www.statesman.com/business/20200425/coronavirus-in-austin-sxsw-sued-overno-refund-policy-after-cancellation.
69
See generally Samuel Lanier Felker & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Tidal Wave of
COVID-19 Lawsuits on the Way, BAKER DONELSON (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.bakerdonelson.com/tidal-wave-of-covid-19-lawsuits-on-the-way (“As the
‘new normal’ sinks in with social distancing and government-imposed shutdowns, some
businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Now, many are about to be slammed with a tidal
wave of litigation as consumers and injured parties seek compensation for COVID-related
losses. A recent flurry of class action and other mass filings gives us a hint of what lies
ahead—and they appear to be only the tip of the iceberg.”).
70
See Class Action Litigation Related to COVID-19: Filed and Anticipated Cases,
PIERCE ATWOOD (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.pierceatwood.com/alerts/class-actionlitigation-related-covid-19-filed-and-anticipated-cases (providing lists of cases filed
against “airlines seeking the refund of payments for cancelled flights based on breach of
contract,” against “fitness clubs, ski resorts, amusement parks, and other organizations
seeking the refund of season passes and membership fees based on breach of contract,
consumer protection, and other theories,” against “nursing and residential care facilities
[that] may face class action litigation based in contract or tort relating to their response to
the COVID-19 pandemic,” against insurers for “breach of contract and declaratory
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must wait for years to obtain results through the judicial system as
none of the emergency laws address contract crisis caused by
COVID-19. Based on the experience the world now has with the
COVID-19 pandemic, parties should from this point forward
include provisions addressing the alternatives that will take place
in the event of a future pandemic.
III. CONTRACT LAW AND STATE OF EMERGENCY
The contemporary debate on the law of contracts centers
on transactional justice—who gets what and whether the deal is
fair.71 Contracts scholars often focus on freedom of contracts,
efficiency, social practice and social trust to justify different
outcomes, but not on whether transactions are fair.72 The debate,
however, does not frame contract law as the law of emergency.
Generally, we do not turn to the government to solve
private ordering problems regardless of whether or not a nation is
in a state of emergency. The unprecedented magnitude of the
COVID-19 crisis generates two different approaches to the
unsurmountable contract problems. On the one hand, parties
utilize existing contract law doctrines to solve COVID-19 related
nonperformance problems. On the other hand, government
intervention solves the contract nonperformance problems and
absolves damages, as seen in China. Preferably, governmental
intervention should not be used, as it creates uncertainty in future
contract negotiations. Additionally, the government is not as
familiar with the goals of the contract as the parties to the contract.
Perhaps most importantly, government intervention undermines
the parties’ freedom to contract.
This section focuses on the first approach by evaluating
how contract law’s doctrines—force majeure, impossibility, and
duty of performing in good faith—address contract issues during
a state of emergency.

judgment claims against insurers for failure to cover losses from forced business closures
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and state executive orders” and against educational
institutions, among others).
71
See Todd D. Rakoff, The Five Justices of Contract Law, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 733
(2016).
72
See id. at 734.
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A. Force Majeure
Contract law resiliently evolves through the test of time,
withstanding plagues, wars, and natural disasters. The cornerstone
of contract law requires courts to respect and enforce what parties
agree upon within the four corners of their agreement.73 Courts do
not redraft or add new terms to agreements that parties already
conclusively executed.74 Parties have the freedom to contract and
freedom from contracts.75 Parties know best their business,
circumstances, risks, and benefits when they execute
agreements.76 Emergencies caused by natural disasters,
epidemics, armed conflicts, and terrorism are among changes of
events that parties typically anticipate and include in a contract’s
force majeure provision.77
73

See Todd D. Rakoff, Is Freedom from Contract Necessarily a Libertarian
Freedom? 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (2004) (“[M]en of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and [] their contracts when
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of
justice.”).
74
See Owens v. Church, 675 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (“The
freedom and sanctity of contract are cornerstones of our system of commercial law and
order. Regardless of where our sympathies might lie in a given case, once it has been
determined that a valid agreement is in existence the courts must enforce that contract.”);
Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 95 (Tex. 2011) (“As a fundamental matter,
Texas law recognizes and protects a broad freedom of contract”); Bernstein v.
TrackManager, Inc., 953 A.2d 1003, 1010 n.23 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“the concept of freedom
on contract, which is a core concept recognized by Delaware law”).
75
See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”,
79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 280–83 (1999) (discussing the individual autonomy of the parties in
the two ideas of freedom of contract and freedom from contract); Venture Assoc. Corp. v.
Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1996) (Cudahy, J., concurring)
(“Freedom not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to contract.”).
76
See Emerald International Corp. v. WWMV, LLC, 2016 WL 4433357, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2016) (“Parties are free to agree that specified events will excuse
nonperformance of their obligations.”).
77
Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 448–49
(Mich. Ct. of App. 2015) A force majeure in a long-term, commercial contract can be
comprehensive, as follows:
Neither Buyer nor Seller shall be liable for delays or failures in
performance of its obligations under this Agreement that arise out
of or result from causes beyond such party's control, including
without limitation: acts of God; acts of the Government or the public
enemy; natural disasters; fire; flood; epidemics; quarantine
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Force majeure clauses excuse a party’s nonperformance
when a specific, extraordinary event occurs that prevents the party
from meeting obligations as described in the contract. In analyzing
whether a party is excused under a force majeure, courts
determine: (1) an event occurred meeting the contract's definition
of force majeure event, and (2) that event caused the party's failure
to perform.78 The party invoking the force majeure clause carries
the burden of proof at trial.79
restrictions; strikes; freight embargoes; war; acts of terrorism;
equipment breakage (which is beyond the affected Buyer's or
Seller's reasonable control and the affected Buyer or Seller shall
promptly use all commercially reasonable efforts to remedy) that
prevents Seller's ability to manufacture Product or prevents Buyer's
ability to use such Product in Buyer's manufacturing operations for
solar applications; or, in the case of Seller only, a default of a Seller
supplier beyond Seller's reasonable control (in each case, a “Force
Majeure Event”). In the event of any such delay or failure of
performance by Buyer or Seller, the other party shall remain
responsible for any obligations that have accrued to it but have not
been performed by it as of the date of the Force Majeure Event.
When the party suffering from the Force Majeure Event is able to
resume performance, the other party shall resume its obligations
hereunder. The Term of this Agreement may be extended for a
period not to exceed three (3) years so as to complete the purchase
and delivery of Product affected by a Force Majeure Event. The
party suffering a Force Majeure Event shall provide the other party
with prompt written notice of (i) the occurrence of the Force
Majeure Event, (ii) the date such party reasonably anticipates
resuming performance under this Agreement and, if applicable, (iii)
such party's request to extend the Term of this Agreement.
In addition, if due to a Force Majeure Event or any other cause,
Seller is unable to supply sufficient goods to meet all demands from
customers and internal uses, Seller shall have the right to allocate
supply among its customers in any manner in which Seller, in its
sole discretion, may determine.
78
Emerald International Corp., 2016 WL 4433357, at *3 (“To invoke this
provision, a party would need to show: (1) that an event occurred meeting the contract's
definition of [force majeure event], and (2) that event caused the party's failure to
perform.”).
79
See Kyocera Corp., 886 N.W.2d at 446 (finding that plaintiff failed to
adequately plead, according to force-majeure clause terms that its “delays or failure in
performance of its obligations under [the] Agreement,” i.e., plaintiff's inability to pay,
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The clause must contain specific events to excuse
nonperformance caused by an event occurring.80 Illustratively, the
force majeure clause in a natural gas sale and purchase agreement
provides that contracting parties are released from their
obligations “in cases of force majeure or chance events affecting
the facilities used for the performance of this contract, such as, in
particular: fire, flood, atmospheric disturbances, storm, tornado,
earthquake, washout, landslide, lightning, epidemic, war, riot,
civil war, insurrection, acts of public enemies, act of government,
strike, lockout.”81 Only the occurrence of events specifically
identified in the force majeure clause will excuse the party
invoking it from nonperformance. If market conditions change
and cause a drop in demand for natural gas, these events fall
outside the scope of the clause and do not excuse
nonperformance.82
Consequently, when parties specify certain force majeure
events in the contract, some courts do not require a showing that
the event’s occurrence was unforeseeable, while other courts
impose that requirement.83 The Fifth Circuit, for instance, does not
“ar[o]se out of or result[ed] from . . . acts of the [Chinese] Government,” such that its
performance should have been excused.”); see also Gulf States Protective Coatings, Inc. v.
Caldwell Tanks, Inc., 2019 WL 7403970, at *9 (W.D. Kentucky, June 18, 2019) (“The
party claiming force majeure has the burden to prove the defense at trial.”).
80
In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F.Supp.2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y., 2012)
(citing Reade v. Stoneybrook Realty, LLC, 434, 882 N.Y.S.2d 8 (2009)) (holding that
force-majeure clauses “will generally only excuse a party's nonperformance if the event
that caused the party's nonperformance is specifically identified”).
81
U.S. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 693 F.Supp. 88, 96 (D. Del 1988).
82
See id. (finding the force majeure Article XIII “contemplates such events as
strikes, lockouts or epidemics, which might affect access to the facilities. However, alleged
economic hardship resulting from market fluctuations is certainly not within the ambit of
Article XIII.”).
83
Compare, e.g., TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 182
(Tex. Ct. of App. 2018) (noting an ongoing “debate regarding whether common-law
notions of foreseeability have any place in the interpretation of modern-day force majeure
clauses. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have reached differing results regarding
whether, and under what circumstances, a showing of unforeseeability is required to show
a force majeure event”), with Gulf Oil Corp., v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 706 F.2d
444, 454 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that even if the Gulf's routine mechanical repairs fell
under the force majeure clause, their frequent occurrence disqualifies the force majeure

442

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

require unforeseeability if the contract explicitly specifies force
majeure events.84 As long as the parties have anticipated the
events and included them in the force majeure clause, the party
invoking the clause should be relieved of liability for the
occurrence regardless of whether the occurrence was foreseeable
or unforeseeable.85
If a force majeure clause contains a catch-all phrase at the
end of a list of specific events, courts typically scrutinize whether
an occurrence is reasonably within the scope.86 Courts decline
nonperformance excuse); see also In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d at
264 (noting how, under New York law, force majeure clauses are “construed narrowly and
will generally only excuse a party’s nonperformance that has been rendered impossible by
an unforeseen event”).
84
See TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 183 (“[W]hen parties specify certain force
majeure events, there is no need to show that the occurrence of such an event was
unforeseeable.”).
85
See Kodiak 1981 Drilling Partnership v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d
715, 716, 721 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir. 1976)) (“[W]hen the
promisor has anticipated a particular event by [] providing for it in a contract, he should be
relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless of whether it was
foreseeable.”); see also Rowan Companies, Inc. v. Transco Exploration Co., Inc., 679
S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex.App.—Houston 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“We hold, as a matter of
law, that the rig's inability to perform was solely due to an event of force majeure as defined
in the contract. Therefore, the force majeure clause controls the rights of the parties. . . . A
fire beyond the control of Transco is within the contractual definition of a force majeure’
event.”).
86
Here is a sample of a force majeure with a catch-all phrase in italics:
Should either Party be prevented or hindered from complying with
any obligation created under this Agreement, other than the
obligation to pay money, by reason of fire, flood, storm, act of God,
governmental authority, labor disputes, war or any other cause not
enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable control of the
Party whose performance is affected, then the performance of any
such obligation is suspended during the period of, and only to the
extent of, such prevention or hindrance, provided the affected Party
exercises all reasonable diligence to remove the cause of force
majeure. The requirement that any force majeure be remedied with
all reasonable diligence does not require the settlement of strikes,
lockouts or other labor difficulties by the Party involved.
TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 179. See also Langham-Hill Petrol., Inc. v. S. Fuels Co., 813
F.2d 1327, 1329–30 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that downturn in market was foreseeable and
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overly broad interpretations and apply the precept of ejusdem
generis to ensure proper results.87 Ejusdem generis dictates that
“words constituting general language of excuse are not to be given
the most expansive meaning possible, but are held to apply only
to the same general kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.”88
Parties to a contract may not be able to anticipate all
changes of events to be included in a force majeure clause, and
they instead may choose a clause with broad scope. Contract
interpretations of broadly worded force majeure clauses generally
side with a narrow approach.89 Consider, this broadly worded
outside the scope of “catch-all” force majeure clause); Benjamin Horney, Why Force
Majeure Isn’t A Golden Ticket Out of M&A Deals, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:34 P.M.
E.D.T.), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265259/why-force-majeure-isn-t-a-goldenticket-out-of-m-a-deals? (cautioning that force majeure clauses that “end by noting
something akin to ‘anything else that's unforeseeable’[] make[] performance impossible.
Such language serves to modify every word before it.”).
87
See TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 181–82 & n.1 (finding “fluctuation in the
commodities markets” cannot qualify as force majeure under the “catch-all” provision of
this force majeure clause for two reasons: “First, it is unreasonable to interpret the “catchall” provision as broadly as suggested by Olmos. Second, application of the ejusdem
generis doctrine compels the conclusion that a decline in oil and gas prices is not the sort
of event covered by the force majeure clause.”).
88
See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 516 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 1987), affd. 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987). See also Team Marketing USA Corp. v.
Power Pact, LLC, 839 N.Y.S.2d 242, 246 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Kel Kim Corp. v.
Central Mkts., 70 N.Y.2d 900, 903, (1987) (finding that “[n]one of the specifically
enumerated events in the clause at issue—strikes, boycotts, war, Acts of God, labor
troubles, riots, and restraints on public authority—are similar in nature to Toyota's actions
in rescheduling or cancelling the promotion schedule. Rather, the enumerated,
unforeseeable events in the force majeure clause ‘pertain to a party's ability to conduct dayto-day commercial operations,’ while the cancellation clause provided plaintiff with
‘bargained-for protection of [its] . . . economic interests’ if the promotional events were
rescheduled or cancelled.”); R&B Falcon Corp. v. Am. Expl. Co., 154 F.Supp.2d 969, 974–
75 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (stating that the force majeure “lists ‘riots, strikes, wars, insurrection,
rebellions, terrorist acts, civil disturbances, dispositions or order of governmental
authority . . . inability to obtain equipment, supplies or fuel’ as other items reasonably
beyond the control of the parties.”).
89
See Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296-97 (N.Y. 1987)
(noting force majeure clauses are narrowly construed and contract nonperformance excuse
is available “only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually
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force majeure provision: “Any delay or failure of either party to
perform its obligations under this Agreement shall be excused if,
and to the extent that the delay or failure is caused or materially
contributed to by force majeure or other acts or events beyond the
reasonable control of a party hereto.”90 Interpreting this particular
force majeure provision narrowly means the scope of the force
majeure may cover the dramatic change in market conditions
caused by an influenza epidemic as the occurrence was beyond
the reasonable control of the party to excuse contract
nonperformance.91 Yet, the interpretation cannot extend to “a
change in purchaser demand—even a substantial change” because
such a change is “a foreseeable part of doing business,” unable to
excuse contract nonperformance.92
In summary, there are no uniform court interpretations
with respect to force majeure provisions and foreseeability, but
courts generally embrace narrow interpretations to respect parties’
freedom to contract and avoid rewriting agreements for the
parties.
B. Force Majeure and Epidemics
There are few reported cases involving contracts
containing force majeure clauses covering epidemics or
pandemics occurring in the past one hundred years. Notably,
during the Spanish influenza of 1918, only one case, Citrus Soap
Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., was reported and penned by a lower
court in California.93
In that case, the plaintiff brought an action to recover
damages for breach of contract against the defendant for the sale
prevents a party’s performance”); In re Cablevision Consumer Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d at264
(under New York law, force majeure clauses are “construed narrowly”).
90
See Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enters., 360 F.Supp.3d 817, 840 (S.D.
Ind. 2018).
91
Id. at 840–41.
92
Id. at 841.
93
Citrus Soap Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 194 P.2d 715 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920);
see Russell Lewis, et al., Covid-19: Force Majeure to the Rescue?, THE HOUS. LAW. 42–
43 (Mar./Apr. 2020), https://issuu.com/leosur/docs/thl_marapr20/42 (“Despite the history
of the Spanish Flu, we could find no reported cases from any U.S. jurisdiction that
addressed force majeure in the context of an epidemic, pandemic or disease outbreak in the
human population.”).
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of glycerine merchandise.94 The parties entered into a contract
dated November 7, 1918, wherein the plaintiff seller sold eleven
to twelve drums of crude glycerine to defendant, and the goods
were to be delivered “as made, but entire delivery to be completed
prior to December 31, 1918.”95 Glycerine as sold by the plaintiff
was the by-product for the defendant to manufacture soap.96 The
contract contained the following force majeure clause:
“This contract is made subject to suspension in
case of fire, flood, explosion, strike or
unavoidable accident to the machinery or the
works of the producers or receivers of this
material, or from any interference in plant by
reason of which either buyers or sellers are
prevented from producing, delivering or
receiving the goods and in such event the delivery
thus suspended is to be made after such
disabilities have been removed; otherwise to be
fulfilled in good faith. Notice, with full
particulars and the probable term of the
continuance of such disability, shall be given to
the other party hereto, within ten days of the date
of the occurrence of such disability.”
The defendant accepted the delivery of the first three drums but
refused to accept the subsequent deliveries of the remaining nine
drums. The plaintiff brought the breach of contract action to
recover the difference between the agreed price per the contract
and the market price when the defendant refused delivery.97 The
trial court found that the plaintiff performed in accordance with
the contract terms, and the defendant appealed.98
During the contract time period of November and
December 1918, the city of San Diego, where the plaintiff’s
94

See Lewis et al., supra note 93, at 715.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. (“goods were shipped and delivered in all respects in conformity with said
contract of sale”).
95
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factory was located to make and distribute glycerine, adopted a
quarantine to control the spread of the Spanish influenza.99 On
December 5, 1918, the quarantine caused a delay in the plaintiff’s
production, and the plaintiff invoked the force majeure clause by
sending a letter to the defendant on December 9, 1918:
Please be advised that we have been forced to
close down by the health authorities due to the
quarantine established in San Diego against the
influenza. The quarantine went into effect Friday
morning, the 6th of December, and we may be
compelled to take advantage of the contingency
clause of our contract. However, we have
finished six drums of the glycerine, three of
which we have already shipped, and we are in
hopes of being able to deliver the entire amount
by December 31st.100
The court found that the plaintiff’s letter sufficiently complied
with the contract requirements, reasonably warned the defendant
of the delay due to the quarantine, and implied that the delay might
cause the completion beyond December 31.101 Moreover, the
defendant did not object to the letter. Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to perform the contract within a
reasonable time after December 31, and the defendant must
therefore perform its obligation to pay the plaintiff.102
In the 21st century, the first pandemic was the H1N1 of
2009.103 Among the many reported court opinions related to
99

Id. at 716.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
The World Health Organization declared H1N1 flu a pandemic on June 11,
2009. See 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and You, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:00 P.M. E.T.), https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm. The
United States declared H1N1 a public health emergency on April 26, 2009; 2009 H1N1
Flu Outbreak: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/
healthactions/phe/Pages/h1n1.aspx; see also McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL
100
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H1N1, none involved contract disputes and force majeure.104
Perhaps parties settled their contract disputes either out of court or
prior to courts issuing written decisions as they had done in
resolving allegations of breach of contract and nonperformance in
the earlier epidemic.
Indeed, before the H1N1 pandemic, parties to contracts
experienced disruptions caused by the deadly Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003.105 In contract
performance disputes due to SARS, parties filed lawsuits but
subsequently settled matters outside of court. For instance, the
American Association for Cancer Research planned to host its
2003 annual conference for 16,000 attendees and signed contracts
with hotels in Toronto and the convention center; however, three
days before the conference was scheduled to open, AACR
canceled the event due to the SARS epidemic.106 For the hotels,
all of their contracts with AACR contained force majeure clauses
that allowed termination of contracts due to major unforeseen
events that would render performance impossible. The hotels and
the convention center insisted that the force majeure clauses do
not apply “because the emergency was confined to area hospitals,
there was not risk to the general public, and business was

2309881, *2 (D. Arizona 2020) (“from April 12, 2009 to April 10, 2010, CDC estimated
there were 60.8 million cases and 12,469 deaths in the United States due to the H1N1
virus”).
104
See Brendan S. Everman, Force Majeure and Covid-19 Live Event
Cancellations, 43-MAY L.A. LAW. 36 (May 2020) (“Recent epidemics like Zika, Ebola,
H1N1, and SARS did not result in the widespread cancellation of high-profile events.
Consequently, there is no clear legal precedent for how courts would apply force majeure
clauses”); see also Bruce Myint, SARS Puts Contracts Under A Microscope, MEETINGS &
CONVENTIONS (May 1, 2003), http://www.meetings-conventions.com/Newsline/SARSPuts-Contracts-Under-a-Microscope/ (noting “there is very little clear precedent” in the
law regarding force majeure clauses in modern contracts because the clauses “often are
limited only to situations that would make it either ‘illegal’ or ‘impossible’ to hold the
event”).
105
See Martha Collins, Cancellation and Force Majeure Issues in the SARS Era,
MEETINGSNET (Mar. 1, 2005), https://www.meetingsnet.com/negotiatingcontracts/cancel
lation-and-force-majeure-issues-sars-era (“Epidemics and diseases that could affect travel
and the safety of attendees are now foreseeable and should be contemplated in the
contract.”).
106
See id.

448

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

proceeding as usual.”107 The total damages as asserted by the
hotels and the convention center reached $6.2 million against
AACR.108 AACR then attempted to convince its insurance
company that AACR’s policy with Aon Insurance Company
covered the situation.109 Ultimately, the parties settled their
disputes out of court.110
On a lesser scale of severity, the global avian influenza
(H7N9) outbreak of 2013 led the United States to declare a public
health emergency on April 19, 2013.111 The avian influenza
impacted the poultry industry in the U.S., and at least one court
issued an opinion addressing contract nonperformance and force
majeure clause. The case, Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes
Stainless, Inc., serves as a good illustration and valuable reminder
of contract law during a state of emergency.
In Rembrandt Enterprises, the district court denied
Dahmes’s summary judgment motion on the issue that the force
majeure clause did not supplant Rembrandt’s excuse of
performance.112 In that case, Rembrandt, an egg producer
planning to build a new egg processing plant near one of its
existing facilities planned for expansion, entered into an
agreement with Dahmes to install a new egg dryer for $8.5 million
dollars.113 The agreement required Dahmes to complete the
installation by January 1, 2016.114 In the spring of 2015, the highly
pathogenic avian influenza hit the U.S.115 The flu forced
Rembrandt to kill more than one million birds and reduced
production capacity by over 50 percent.116 Rembrandt supplied the

107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/
phe/Pages/H7N9-influenza-virus.aspx.
112
Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 2017 WL 3929308
(N.D. Iowa 2017).
113
Id. at *1–2.
114
Id. at *2.
115
Id.
116
Id.
108
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reduced egg capacity on a pro rata basis to its buyers.117 By May
2015, Rembrandt stopped the facility expansion and informed
Dahmes about the stoppage.118 Rembrandt sought a declaratory
relief regarding its contract with Dahmes and requested restitution
and an accounting of Dahmes’ expenses.119 Dahmes asserted that
Rembrandt breached the contract and sought lost profits of $2.4
million, plus costs incurred.120 Rembrandt already paid Dahmes
$4.31 million prior to the alleged breach.121
At summary judgment, Dahmes argued that the “force
majeure superseded any other claims Rembrandt might raise to
excuse the breach.”122 In ruling against Dahmes, the court noted
that the contract between Rembrandt and Dahmes contained a
force majeure provision which states that “[n]either party shall be
liable to the other for failure or delay in performance of the Work
caused by war, riots, insurrections, proclamations, floods, fires,
explosions, acts of any governmental body, terrorism, or other
similar events beyond the reasonable control and without the fault
of such party.”123 The contract defined the “Work” as the design,
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *12. The force majeure provision states:
Neither party shall be liable to the other for failure or delay in
performance of the Work caused by war, riots, insurrections,
proclamations, floods, fires, explosions, acts of any governmental
body, terrorism, or other similar events beyond the reasonable
control and without the fault of such party (“Force Majeure Event”).
Nevertheless, such party shall use its best efforts to mitigate the
effect and to perform in spite of the difficulties causing such failure
or delay and shall resume performance with the utmost dispatch as
soon as the cessation of the Force Majeure Event permits. Any party
claiming force majeure shall give prompt written notice thereof to
the other party. Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other
provision of this Agreement, if either party is unable to resume
performance within ninety (90) days after commencement of a
Force Majeure Event, then the other party shall have the right to
immediately terminate this Agreement with all available insurance
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equipment, and labor provided by Dahmes for the building,
including delivering and installing the egg dryer.124 Accordingly,
the court found that the clause “applies to a failure or delay in the
performance of Dahmes' obligations under the contract.”125 The
force majeure did not apply to Rembrandt’s obligation to pay
under the contract.126 The express language of the force majeure
clause “demonstrates that it does not apply” to the avian flu
outbreak, as the parties did not intend for an unforeseen event such
as the avian flu to prevent the construction and installation of the
dryer by Dahmes.127 This holding illustrates the need for parties to
specifically include language for a pandemic in the future.
Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and force majeure
provisions, parties to contracts invoke them to excuse
nonperformance and minimize damages.128In re Cinemex USA
Real Estatle Holdings, Inc., is an example of how courts examine
a force majeure clause in assessing whether the clause covers
COVID-19 related events to excuse contract performance.129
Here, the contract for commercial lease of theatre movie venues
contained the following clause in contemplation of events that
parties might not be able to perform their obligations:
If either party to this Lease, as the result of any (i)
strikes, lockouts or labor disputes, (ii) inability to
proceeds to be held in a separate account by the policy insured as a
fiduciary which will distribute the proceeds between the parties in
an equitable fashion.
124
Id. at *12.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at *12–13.
128
See generally UPDATE: Force Majeure Under the Coronavirus (COVID-19)
Pandemic, PAUL WEISS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/
litigation/publications/update-force-majeure-under-the-coronavirus-covid-19pandemic?id=30881; see also Joshua M. Cartee & William M. Mattes, Origins of the Force
Majeure Clause and Impossibility of Contractual Performance Defense, NAT. L. REV.
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/origins-force-majeure-clause-andimpossibility-contractual-performance-defense; John Delikanakis & Gil Kahn, Force
Majeure Clauses and the Impossible and the Impractical, SNELL & WILMER (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.swlaw.com/publications/legal-alerts/2739.
129
In re Cinemex USA Real Estatle Holdings, Inc., et al., 2021 WL 564486, *4
(S.D. Fla. 2021).
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obtain labor or materials or reasonable substitutes
therefor, (iii) the inability to obtain materials or
labor at reasonable prices due to the occurrence
of a hurricane or other nature disaster or due to
terrorism; (iv) acts of God, governmental action,
condemnation, civil commotion, fire or other
casualty, or (v) other conditions similar to those
enumerated in this Section beyond the reasonable
control of the party obligated to perform (other
than failure to timely pay monies required to be
paid under this Lease), fails punctually to perform
any obligation on its part to be performed under
this Lease, then such failure shall be excused and
not be a breach of this Lease by the party in
question, but only to the extent occasioned by
such event.130
The tenant refused to make payments under the lease agreement
citing to impossibility of performance while the government
orders were in effect.131 With respect to rent accruing during the
government ordered shutdown, the court assessed “whether it was
foreseeable at the time the lease was made that this shutdown
would occur.”132 The court found that, on the one hand, COVID19 events that caused the shutdown were not foreseeable. On the
other hand, the lease agreement anticipated such events and
included them in the contract. Accordingly, the court ruled, the
failure to operate the theatre was excused due to the shutdown
orders.133
Likewise, in JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips
Auctioneers LLC, Southern District of New York court relieved
the defendant from its nonperformance liability due to COVID-19
force majeure.134 In that case, the plaintiff art dealer and the
defendant auction house entered into a contract governing the sale
130

Id. (emphasis added by the court).
Id. at *1.
132
Id. at *3.
133
Id.
134
JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, 2020 WL 7405262
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
131
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of two paintings in June 2019.135 The defendant agreed to pay the
plaintiff a guaranteed minimum price in connection with the
sale.136 One of the two paintings was sold the same day the parties
executed the agreement but the other painting was scheduled for
auction in May 2020.137 By March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic
crippled New York and Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a State
Disaster Emergency and issued executive orders restricting and
then barring all non-essential business activities until June
2020.138 In light of the circumstances, the defendant terminated
the agreement.139 The plaintiff sought an order to compel the
defendant to include the second painting at the defendant’s next
auction and pay the Guaranteed Minimum.140 Alternatively, the
plaintiff sought compensatory damages of $7 million and punitive
damages of $10 million.141
The court turned to the agreement’s “Termination
Provision” for its force majeure interpretation. The Termination
Provision stated:
“In the event that the auction is postponed for
circumstances beyond our or your reasonable
control, including, without limitation, as a result
of natural disaster, fire, flood, general strike, war,
armed conflict, terrorist attack or nuclear or
chemical contamination, we may terminate this
Agreement with immediate effect. In such event,
our obligation to make payment of the
Guaranteed Minimum shall be null and void and
we shall have no other liability to you.”142
The court noted that the COVID-19 pandemic and government
emergency executive orders “fall squarely under the ambit” of the
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 (emphasis in original).
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force majeure clause because they are “beyond the parties’
reasonable control.”143 The court also looked to Black’s Law
Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary for support that the
COVID-19 pandemic is a “natural disaster.”144 As a natural
disaster, the COVID-19 caused the “cessation of normal business
activity” that was beyond the parties’ control.145 In other words,
the pandemic’s circumstances were “envisioned” by the
Termination Provision.146 Accordingly, the defendant was entitled
to terminate the agreement.147
As seen, contract law on force majeure resiliently applies
to private contracts ordering under state of emergency situations.
Through many different epidemics and pandemics, parties
excused nonperformance by allocating their risks and anticipating
events with specificities in force majeure provisions. This explicit
inclusion of potential pandemics can save parties from
unanticipated costs without the need for government intervention.
C. The Doctrine of Impossibility and Supervening Events
In situations where parties to a contract cannot perform
the contract due to supervening events but their contract does not
include a force majeure provision to accommodate the events,
contract law provides the doctrine of impossibility, or also later
referred to by the courts as commercial impracticability to excuse
nonperformance.
The doctrine of impossibility, as discussed in much
143

Id. at *7.
Id. Other courts have also found that the Covid-19 pandemic is a natural
disaster. See, e.g., Easom v. US Well Services, Inc., 2021 WL 1092344, *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
19, 2021) (finding the Covid-19 pandemic “qualifies as a disaster under the Worker
Retraining and Notification Act); AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC,
No. 20-CV-0310, 2020 WL 7024929, at *58 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020) (“The COVID-19
pandemic arguably fits this definition [of natural disaster]” under a purchase and sale
agreement); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 370 (Pa. 2020) (“We have
no hesitation in concluding that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic equates to a natural
disaster” under a Pennsylvania statute); Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872,
889 (Pa. 2020) (“The COVID-19 pandemic is, by all definitions, a natural disaster” under
a Pennsylvania statute).
145
JN Contemporary Art LLC, supra note 134, at *8.
146
Id.
147
Id. at *9.
144
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greater depth elsewhere, enjoys its roots in Roman law that “there
is no obligation to the impossible.”148 Impossibility can arise due
to unexpected changes of circumstances.149 As to the theory of
supervening events or changed circumstances, the doctrine of
impossibility owes its origin to Canon law’s doctrine of changed
circumstances.150
Generally, “by act of god, the law or the other party”
which renders the performance of a contract impossible, the party
is excused from performing its end of the contract.151 The United
States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of
impossibility in The Tornado v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. in 1883.152
In applying the doctrine of impossibility, courts generally do not
readily excuse the parties from their contractual obligations.153
148

See James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances,
52 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 513, 513 (2004) (tracing the origins of the impossibility doctrine).
149
See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
150
See id. See generally Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in
International Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 614 n.37 (2001) (“Western contract law doctrines of
impossibility, commercial impracticality, frustration, and force majeure reflect a similar
notion of the primacy and sanctity of written contracts.”).
151
See, e.g., Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412
(1919) (denying World War I’s outbreak rendered performance of railway contract
impossible); Wheelabrator Envirotech Operating Servs. v. Mass. Laborers Dist. Council
Local 1144, 88 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting neither impossibility nor impracticability
excuse a party’s express undertaking to perform).
152
See The Tornado v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 108 U.S. 342, 351 (1883) (“[I]n
contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a given person
or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the
perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.”). The Tornado court
adopted the contract rule on impossibility excuse from the celebrated English case, Taylor
v. Coldwell, 3 Best & S. 826 (1863); see also Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. 1, 6 (1864) (“It
regards the sanctity of contracts. It requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If
unexpected impediments lie in the way, and a loss must ensue, it leaves the loss where the
contract places it. If the parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the rule of law
gives none. It does not allow a contract fairly made to be annulled, and it does not permit
to be interpolated what the parties themselves have not stipulated.”); Opera Co. of Boston,
Inc. v. Wolf Trap Foundation for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1097–1102 (4th Cir.
1987) (discussing the evolution of the impossibility of performance doctrine).
153
See generally Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of
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The nonperformance must objectively be deemed as impossible.
The objective standard of impossibility prevents the party seeking
excuse to unilaterally redraft the contract or add new terms to the
contract.154 For instance, in North German Lloyd v. Guaranty
Trust Co., the Court excused contract performance where the
owner of the German steamship could not complete the voyage to
deliver gold to England on the eve of war in Europe because the
ship would be seized as a prize.155 In Montgomery v. Board of
Education of Liberty TP., Union County, the Ohio Supreme Court
did not excuse the school board from their obligation to pay bus
drivers during the Spanish flu of 1918 that caused school
closures.156 The Court rejected the defense that the school board’s
performance to pay the drivers pursuant to the contract terms
during the highly contagious flu period was made impossible by
the health authority’s order.157
Higher cost of performance than previously anticipated in
the contract generally fails to meet the impossibility
Commercial Impracticability, 13 U. of N.H. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); United States v. Gleason,
175 U. S. 588, 602 (1900) (“[I]f a party by his contract charge himself with an obligation
possible to be performed, he must make it good, unless his performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Difficulties, even if unforeseen,
and however great, will not excuse him. If parties have made no provision for a
dispensation, the rule of law gives none, nor, in such circumstances, can equity interpose.”).
154
See generally Columbus R. Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412
(1919) (“Where the parties have made no provision for a dispensation, the terms of the
contract must prevail.”); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588, 602 (1900) (“it is
competent for parties to a contract, . . . to make it a term of the contract . . . , shall be final
and conclusive, and that, in the absence of fraud or of mistake so gross as to necessarily
imply bad faith, such decision will not be subjected to the revisory power of the courts.”);
Chicago, M. & S.P.R. Co. v. Hoyt, 149 U. S. 1, 14, 15 (1893) (“There can be no question
that a party may by an absolute contract bind himself or itself to perform things which
subsequently become impossible, or pay damages for the nonperformance, and such
construction is to be put upon an unqualified undertaking, where the event which causes
the impossibility might have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract, or where
the impossibility arises from the act or default of the promisor. But where the event is of
such a character that it cannot be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation
of the contracting parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by
general words, which, though large enough to include, were not used with reference to the
possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards happens.”).
155
See North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 U.S. 12, 22–23 (1917).
156
Montgomery v. Board of Educ. 131 N.E. 497, 497 (Ohio 1921).
157
See id.
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requirement.158 Illustratively, in Columbus R. Power & Light Co.
v. Columbus, the Supreme Court rejected that World War I’s
outbreak rendered performance of railway contract impossible
due to higher costs caused by the war.159 Under the modern
approach of impossibility, some courts focus on commercial
impracticability due to difficulty attributed to either physical or
substantially higher cost.160
Unanticipated government regulations may render
contracts impossible to perform. For instance, in International
Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
ruled that the buyer, International Minerals and Chemical Corp
(IMC), was excused from purchasing the minimum purchase
obligations under the contract due to changes in government
regulation that rendered the contract impossible.161 In that case,
IMC entered into a contract with Llano for the purchase of natural
gas. The contract contained provisions related to the minimum
purchase obligation, stating in the event the buyer is “unable to
receive gas as provided in the contract for any reason beyond the
reasonable control of the parties . . . ” then “an appropriate
adjustment in the minimum purchase requirements . . . shall be
made.”162 Subsequently, in December 1978, the New Mexico
Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) promulgated
158
See generally Columbus R. Power & Light, 249 U.S. at 411 (rejecting the
railroad company’s contention that “the conditions following the World
War . . . particularly in the great increase in wages by the arbitral award of the War Labor
Board,” caused the “subsequent keeping of the contract practically impossible, except at a
ruinous loss to the company”). Nicholas R. Weiskop, Frustration of Contractual
Purpose—Doctrine or Myth?, 70 ST. JOHN L. REV. 239, 270 n.126 (1996) (“[T]he
traditional reluctance of American courts to excuse a performance made significantly more
expensive than anticipated by supervening circumstance.”).
159
Columbus R. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. at 413–14 (“It is undoubtedly true
that the breaking out of the World War was not contemplated, nor was the subsequent
action of the War Labor Board within the purview of the parties when the contract was
made. . . . We are unable to find here the intervention of that superior force which ends the
obligation of a valid contract by preventing its performance. It may be, and taking the
allegations of the bill to be true, it undoubtedly is, a case of a hard bargain. But equity does
not relieve from hard bargains simply because they are such.”).
160
See Mineral Park Land v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916).
161
See International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th
Cir. 1985).
162
See id. at 887.
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Regulation 508 to limit from potash processing equipment and
encouraged compliances “as expeditiously as practicable” and not
later than December 31, 1982.163 IMC participated with the EIB
in the Rule 508 rulemaking process and complied with the new
regulation.164 Consequently, IMC did not need as much natural
gas and asserted that it should be excused from accepting the
minimum purchase requirement under the contract.165
In interpreting the contract terms and ruling for IMC, the
Tenth Circuit found that “unable” meant “impracticability” due to
“having to comply with a supervening governmental
regulation.”166 Because there existed “no technically suitable way
for IMC to comply with the EIB's Regulation 508 without shutting
down the Ozarks and changing to the SOP, with the concomitant
decrease in natural gas consumption, we hold that the adjustment
provision of paragraph 16 of the contract was triggered.”167
Accordingly, IMC was “unable, for reasons beyond its reasonable
control, to receive its minimum purchase obligation of natural
gas” and the amount must be adjusted.168 The Tenth Circuit held
that IMC should “not be required to pay for any natural gas it did
not take under the contract.”169
In the current COVID-19 pandemic, parties to contract
who are unable to perform may assert the defense of impossibility.
The doctrine of impossibility resiliently allows courts to
determine whether parties to a contract are excused from
nonperformance of obligations under contracts due to the arrival
of COVID-19, subsequent government orders to shut down, and
social distancing.
For instance, students filed a number of breach of contract
cases against their universities for pivoting to online education and
activities. In Hiatt v. Brigham Young University, the student
brought a breach of contract and unjust enrichment action against
the University arising from the change from in-person to online
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 886–87.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id.
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classes and campus activities.170 The University moved to dismiss
the suit for failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion
because the student sufficiently alleged that he performed his
obligation under the contract, but the University failed to perform
their obligations.171 Also, the court rejected the University’s
affirmative defense of impracticability defense that it was
impracticable for BYU to provide in-person education and
services during the COVID-19 pandemic.172 The court noted that
under Utah law, the dismissal of a claim for failure to state claim
on the basis of an affirmative defense can only occur if “the
defense is clear from the face of the Complaint.”173 Also, the
doctrine of impracticability excuses a party’s performance if an
unforeseen event occurs after contract formation and without fault
of the obligated party, rendering “the performance impossible or
highly impracticable.”174 Parties who assume the risk of
supervening events cannot defend on grounds of
impracticability.175 Here, the University urged the court to take
judicial notice of the COVID-19 pandemic and government orders
that cause the University’s performance impracticable. Moreover,
the University asserted that the student himself “bore the risk of a
supervening event” because the student’s Financial Responsibility
Declaration in which the student agreed to “pay all tuition upon
registration.”176 At the early stage of the litigation, the court could
not grant the University’s motion to dismiss based on the
affirmative defense of impracticability because it is “essential to
know which party bears the risk” before the court could determine
whether impracticability is a valid defense.177 The court found that
the language of the students’ Financial Responsibility Declaration
“does not unequivocally answer which party bears the risk” and
therefore, the University’s defense is not clear on the face of the

170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Hiatt v. Brigham Young University, 2021 WL 66298 (D. Utah Jan. 7, 2021).
See id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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complaint.178
Another type of case involving breach of contract and the
doctrine of impossibility defense is the enforcement of settlement
agreement that at least one court has issued an opinion.
Illustratively, in Belk v. Le Chaperon Rouge Co., the parties
entered into a settlement agreement in March 2020 for a noncontract case.179 The settlement agreement became a contract
between the parties. The plaintiff then sought to enforce the
agreement but the defendant asserted that due to COVID-19 and
government shutdown order of children centers, including
defendant’s facilities, the defendant could not pay the agreed
amount under the settlement.180 The court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff upon a finding that the defendant was fully aware by the
time of entering the settlement agreement that the government
already declared a state of emergency, asked educational
institutions to move online, and urged all not to attend indoor
events.181 Therefore, the court rejected the defendant’s defense of
impossibility.182 The court ordered enforcement of the settlement
agreement.183 Because of the lack of clarification in the contract
about how to proceed if the pandemic were to interfere with the
contract, the plaintiff was forced to perform.
D. Frustration of Purpose Doctrine
The twin sibling of the doctrine of impossibility to excuse
nonperformance of a contract is frustration of purpose. Under
contract law, a person who is still capable of performing the
contract does not perform the contract because the value of the
contract to that person has been reduced significantly. The

178
Id. See also Gibson v. Lynn University, Inc., 2020 WL 7024463, (S.D. Fla.
2020) (denying the defendant University’s motion to dismiss upon a finding that the
University failed to conclusively establish that the breach of contract claim was barred by
the defense of impossibility).
179
Belk v. Le Chaperon Rouge Co., 2020 WL 3642880, *10 (N.D. Ohio Jul 6,
2020).
180
See id.
181
Id.
182
Id. (additionally, the court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate
financially that the defendant could not pay in accordance with the settlement agreement).
183
Id.
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purpose of the contract is frustrated.184 In other words, the doctrine
of frustration of purpose is distinct from the doctrine of
impossibility.185 In impossibility or commercial impracticability,
the party’s nonperformance is excused because the cost of
performance is prohibitive compared to what is contemplated in
the contract.186 Also, with a supervening event, the party cannot
perform due to the person or the thing perishing which causes
performance of the contract to be impossible.187 However, under
the doctrine of frustration of purpose, the ability to perform exists,
and the party to the contract can still perform because there is no
impossibility of performance.188 Nevertheless, the party does not
wish to perform because of the diminished value of the
performance. The excuse for nonperformance in frustration of
purpose, however, requires that a supervening event occurs that
causes the frustration. Also, the party asserting the defense of
frustration of purpose neither assumes the risk nor is at fault.189
Underlying the doctrine of frustration of purpose is economic
efficiency, waste prevention, and freedom from contract.190
Relating back to Rembrandt Enterprise v. Dahmes
discussed in the force majeure section, frustration of purpose of
contract during a pandemic is illustrated.191 Here, Rembrandt
ordered Dahmes to stop building and installing the egg dryer
184
See In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 564486, *3 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 27, 2021).
185
See id.
186
See id.
187
See id.
188
Id. (noting “Impossibility of performance refers to the nature of the thing to be
done, and . . . frustration of purpose arises when one of the parties finds that the purposes
for which he or she bargained [has been unfulfilled] because of the failure of consideration
or impossibility of performance by the other party”).
189
See Michelle L. Evans, Impossibility of Performing Contract, 102 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 401 (2008).
190
See City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“Where, after a
contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by
the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless
the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”).
191
Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 2017 WL 3929308
(N.D. Iowa, Sep. 7, 2017).
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several months after contract formation. Rembrandt cited to the
avian flu for the severe drop in egg demand that forced Rembrandt
to scuttle the new facility construction, including the purchase and
installation of the new dryer for the facility. Under contract law,
Rembrandt may attempt to rely on the doctrine of frustration of
purpose to excuse its performance. That means Rembrandt may
argue that its principal purpose to “supply equipment for the egg
processing facility under construction” at Rembrandt's new
facility was frustrated. Therefore, the egg dryer to be completed
by Dahmes yielded little or no value to Rembrandt.192 Whether
Rembrandt would prevail depends on whether Dahmes also
possessed the same understanding of Rembrandt’s purpose when
the parties entered the contract.193
During COVID-19, parties to contract breached cases
routinely asserting frustration of purpose as a defense. For
example, in the bankruptcy case involving Cinemex USA Real
Estate Holdings, Inc., the debtors were in the theatre movie
business in twelve states.194 The debtors sought to delay payments
for rent incurred after June 5, 2020, relying on the doctrine of
frustration of purpose as excuse for nonperformance. The court in
that case, applying Florida contract law on frustration of purpose,
observed that the defense is not available if relevant business risk
was “foreseeable” at contract formation and “could have been the
subject of an express contractual agreement.”195 The court took
notice that the government shutdown of business in Florida prior
to June 5, 2020 made it impossible for the debtors to operate the
theatre. However, when the government lifted the shutdown order
on June 5, 2020, the debtors could have reopened their business,
Id. at *12 (N.D. Iowa, Sep. 7, 2017) (“Rembrandt contends that its obligation
to buy the Dahmes dryer is excused because, the Thompson processing facility could not
be built as a result of the HPAI outbreak, and therefore the dryer no longer has any value
to Rembrandt.”).
193
See id. at *6–9 (analyzing Dahmes’s arguments and providing analysis of both
parties’ arguments).
194
In re Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 2021 WL 564486 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 27, 2021).
195
See id. (frustration of purpose “refers to that condition surrounding the
contracting parties where one of the parties finds that the purposes for which [it] bargained,
and which purposes were known to the other party, have been frustrated because of the
failure of consideration, or impossibility of performance by the other party”).
192
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but choose not to do so. Accordingly, no frustration of purpose
existed. The court rejected the debtor’s argument that opening the
theaters at 50% capacity coupled with increased costs of providing
protective gears to employees would generate negative operating
income and should be covered by the doctrine of frustration of
purpose.196
Likewise, in Great New York Automobile Dealers Assn,
Inc. v. City Spec, LLC, the parties litigated a nonpayment breach
of a commercial lease contract case, and the court issued a ruling
in favor of the landlord.197 The tenant asserted a defense of
frustration of purpose for their nonpayment because of the
Governor’s Executive Order stating that all non-essential
businesses must close in person operations due to the COVID-19
public health crisis. The tenant’s staff could not come to work
causing frustration of the contract’s purpose.198 The tenant
requested that the rent be excused. Applying New York contract
law, the court noted that to establish the frustration of purpose
defense, a party must prove (1) the frustration must relate to the
principal purpose of the contract; (2) the frustration must be
substantial; and (3) the frustrating event must be unforeseen that
its non-occurrence was the basic assumption of which the contract
was made.199 The court found the tenant failed to meet the test.
Specifically, the court found that the tenant services fell within the
essential services per the Executive Order that the tenant could
have all their staff to continue in-person operations, but the tenants
decided not to have the business operate—the tenant “frustrated
their own purpose.”200
E. The Duty of Performing in Good Faith
Under contract law, each party must perform and enforce

Id. at *5 (“CB Theater chose not to do so for what appears, based on the Marti
declaration, to be primarily economic concerns. Therefore CB Theater's performance under
the Lakeside Lease from June 5, 2020 on is not excused under the doctrine of frustration
of purpose.”).
197
Great New York Automobile Dealers Assn, Inc. v. City Spec, LLC, 136
N.Y.S.3d 695 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec. 29, 2020).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
196

JUNE 2021

CONTRACT AS EMERGENCY LAW

463

the contract in good faith.201 The duty of good faith and fair
dealing is important in holding the parties to “an implied
obligation that neither party shall do anything to injure or destroy
the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the
agreement.”202 If a party acts in bad faith or engages in inequitable
conduct in performing its obligations under the contract, the party
breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.203
Overall, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is used to
“effectuate the intentions of the parties or to honor their
reasonable expectations.”204 The duty does not provide the basis
for a stand-alone claim; rather, the claim is part of an overall
breach of contract claim.205
Demonstrably, in Anadarko Peroleum Corp. v. Noble
Drilling, the district court found there was violation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing by Anadarko. There, Anadarko
invoked the force majeure clause in the contract when the Mineral
Management Service of the Department of Interior ordered
Anadarko to cease drilling on Well No. 2 at Keathley Canyon and
informed Anadarko about a six month drilling moratorium in the
Gulf of Mexico.206 The moratorium rendered the contract to drill
in the Gulf of Mexico impossible as the evidence established that
Anadarko would incur “substantial, and perhaps excessive and
impractical costs” if it continued to pursue operations in
accordance with the contract in the Gulf of Mexico during the
moratorium period.207 The court ruled for Anadarko’s declaration
of the force majeure was not done in bad faith.208 Though this
201

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (Am. L. Inst. 1981).
23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 63.22 (4th ed. 2020).
203
See id. See also Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC., 2012
WL 13040279, 1, 22 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding no violation of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing).
204
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo. 1995).
205
See Cut-Heal Animal Care Products, Inc. v. Agri-Sales Associates, Inc., 2011
WL 1563165, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
206
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Noble Drilling (U.S.) LLC., supra note 203,
at *22.
207
Id.
208
Id. See also SNB Farms, Inc. v. Swift and Company, 2003 WL 22232881, *5
(N.D. Iowa, Feb. 7, 2003) (finding that the defendant’s termination of the contract in
accordance with the contract terms did not violate the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
202
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decision did not arise in a pandemic, it is still instructive.209
In COVID-19-related contract disputes, a party that
refuses to perform obligations under a contract must adhere to the
duty of performing the contract in good faith.210 That means if the
contract contains a force majeure provision, the party invoking the
provision must establish through evidence that invoking the
provision is fully supported. Likewise, if the contract does not
contain a force majeure and the party wishes to rely on the
doctrine of impossibility to excuse nonperformance, the party
must demonstrate that its excuse meets the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.
For instance, in Su Sung Shin v. Yoon, the plaintiff brought
a breach of contract against the defendants to recover funds she
provided for investment in a hotel property of $1.5 million.211 The
parties settled the case, and the plaintiff attempted to enforce the
settlement agreement wherein the defendants were to pay the
plaintiff installment payments.212 The defendants, as the judgment
debtors, relied on the doctrine of impossibility of performance as
a defense to non-payments.213 The defendant asserted that due to
COVID-19, they could not sell the hotel for a sufficient price to
satisfy the installments.214 The court rejected the defendants’
argument because of the fact that the defendants “are currently
unable to raise the funds necessary to make the two $50,000
payments due under the Stipulated Judgment; however, this
obviously does not mean that COVID-19 has “likewise” deprived
“other persons” of the ability to make $50,000 payments.”215
Though the court did not explicitly discuss good faith
209

See Pennington v. Continental Resources, Inc., 2019 ND 228, 932 N.W.2d 897,
902 (“An express force majeure clause in a contract must be accompanied by proof that the
failure to perform was proximately caused by a contingency and that, in spite of skill,
diligence, and good faith on the promisor's part, performance remains impossible or
unreasonably expensive.”).
210
See Faye Milton and Paul Palik, Contracting “Good Faith” in Covid-19,
LEXOLOGY (July 29, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dd5710c91d0f-4836-9392-dc010c216942
211
Su Jung Shin v. Yoon, 2020 WL 6044086, *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct 13, 2020).
212
See id.
213
Id. at *6.
214
Id.
215
Id.
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performance, the court found that the defendants “have not made
a showing and cannot make-such as showing” of the impossibility
defense.216 In other words, the defendants failed both the duty to
performance of the contract in good faith and the defense of
impossibility defense.217 These cases provide a roadmap showing
that if a party has not included a pandemic in the force majeure
clause in the contract, it must be able to show it met the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, even though this has not been
demonstrated by case law as of yet.
IV. BEYOND THE UNITED STATES’ BORDERS: CHINA’S
APPROACH TO CONTRACTS UNDER STATE OF
EMERGENCY LAW
In China, with many domestic and international contracts,
the COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented crisis in the
first half of 2020 because parties could not perform their
obligations or undertakings under existing contract terms. Chinese
companies in contracts with international partners for the
manufacturing and distribution of products and parts in the global
supply chains network invoked the force majeure clauses to
protect their businesses when the companies could not fulfill their
contractual obligations.218 Indeed, as of March 3, 2020, thousands
of companies insulated themselves from breach of contract
damages by invoking the force majeure provisions.219 The
companies together invoked 4,800 contracts with force majeure
provisions, and in total value, these contracts estimated a
staggering $53.79 billion dollars.220
China’s legal system is still evolving with respect to
contract law. Legal doctrines related to force majeure,
impossibility, frustration of purpose, duty to perform contracts in
good faith and fair dealing, mitigation, and damages are not as
216

Id.
Id.
218
See Huileng Tan, China Invokes “Force Majeure” to Protect Businesses — but
the Companies May be in for a “Rude Awakening,” CNBC (Mar. 6, 2020, 5:53 A.M.),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/coronavirus-impact-china-invokes-force-majeure-toprotect-businesses.html.
219
See id.
220
See id.
217
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robust compared to the United States and other nations.221 In terms
of force majeure, PRC law defines is as objective circumstances
that cannot be foreseen or avoided and cannot be overcome.222
Additionally, a party correctly exerting a force majeure clause has
no obligation to perform or mitigate damages.223
For domestic contracts, China’s Supreme People’s Court
issued guidance on judicial interpretations of contracts that
possesses the legal force as Chinese laws and regulations.224 With
respect to contracts involving international parties, China instead
adopted a different approach to address contracts in emergency
through the authority exerted by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade (the Council).225 China
continuously used this unusual approach in order to protect its
domestic companies from feeling the severe economic impact.226
However, through this “protection,” the Chinese counterparties
will be “hit by a wave” of unsuspected force majeure certificates,
which is unheard of between the affairs of private parties.227
The China Ministry of Commerce and the Council’s local
branches coordinated their efforts in March 2020 to issue force
See Force Majeure Plus – The Use of Force Majeure Provisions in China
During Covid-19, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2020/04/forcemajeure-plus-the-use-of-force-majeure-provisions-in-china-during-covid-19 (explaining
force majeure in China and various government directives and high-level Supreme
People’s Court Guidance on the availability of force majeure to mitigate losses and
nonperformance); Is SARS a Force Majeure Event? A Brief Overview of Hong Kong and
PRC Law, MARTINDALE (June 17, 2003), https://www.martindale.com/businesslaw/article_Perkins-Coie-LLP_13314.htm.
222
Is SARS a Force Majeure Event? A Brief Overview of Hong Kong and PRC
Law, supra note 221.
223
Id.
224
See Jenny Y. Liu & Carrie Bai, Coronavirus in the Chinese Law Context: Force
Majeure and Material Adverse Change, PILLSBURY (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.pillsbu
rylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/coronavirus-in-the-chinese-law-context-force-majeureand-material-adverse-change.html.
225
See Anton A. Ware et al., What to Do When You Receive a Coronavirus-Related
Force Majeure Notice, ARNOLD & PORTER (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.co
m/en/perspectives/publications/2020/03/what-to-do-when-you-receive-a-coronavirus
(stating that the Council is a “nongovernmental organization with deep government roots”).
226
See id.
227
See id.
221
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majeure certificates.228 The Council permits contracting parties
who are exporters desiring to invoke force majeure provisions to
excuse performance by applying for force majeure certificates.229
To obtain the certificate, the applicant only needs to show that
they are “suffering from circumstances beyond their control.”230
The threshold requirement is low enabling Chinese exporters to
meet it with ease.231 In addition, the certificates are available to
both companies with executed contracts and “companies that have
failed to execute their contracts on time or have not been able to
execute their international trade contracts are entitled to apply for
the certificates.”232
The Council holds the authority to swiftly determine and
issue a force majeure certificate. In fact, by March 11, 2020, the
Council issued 5,637 force majeure certificates to companies in
China affected by COVID-19, and these certificates represented
contracts in total value of $72.47 billion dollars.233 By issuing the
force majeure certificates, the Council reduced the losses incurred
by the companies during the peak of the pandemic.234 The Council
claims that the force majeure certificates are recognized by “more
than 200 countries and regions.”235
228

See id.
See Zhong Nan, Commerce Chambers Urged to Issue Force Majeure
Certificates, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/06/
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Companies, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/17/
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Ma Zhenhuan, Huzhou Firm 1st in Nation to Get Force Majeure Certificate, CHINA DAILY
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/03/WS5e37bef6a310128217274
6fa.html.
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See Zhong, supra note 229 (“Applicants must submit proof of delay in the
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By allowing the Council to issue the force majeure
certificates to breaching parties, China expeditiously addressed
contract nonperformance in the state of emergency. The issuance
insures certainty, in addition to efficiency, but there are several
problems with China’s approach.236
The Council, acting as an administrative agency, renders
decisions that are the equivalence of redrafting thousands of
contracts that have been bargained for and entered into by the
parties. The Council possesses the extraordinary power of
revisions that contracting parties, particularly, international
parties neither know nor accept. These revisions go against the
very foundation of contract law–the power of the two parties to
contract privately and as they see fit. The Council’s conduct
intimates a level of coercion when a quasi-administrative body
unilaterally rewrites or introduces new terms to negotiated
contracts. Further, the swiftness of the issuance suggests that the
Council does not carefully analyze the force majeure provisions.
As shown in preceding sections on contract norms, interpretating
force majeure provisions is not a simple process in breach of
contract and nonperformance law. Even if each of these contracts
are solved amicably, the litigation involved will be messy, and it
will take time to address each case.237 In addition, invoking force
majeure alone does not automatically relieve the invoking party
with the provision from contractual liability because contract law
requires the breaching party to prove that the COVID-19
supervening events specifically cause the contract
“five business areas - manufacturing, wholesale and retail, construction, leasing and
business services, and power generation equipment production”), https://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/a/202002/27/WS5e57bcd5a31012821727adfc.html.
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https://www.bdbpitmans.com/insights/force-majeure-certificates-china-leads-but-doesthe-uk-follow/ (“The CCPIT has claimed that the certificates will be recognised
internationally. Given the novelty of the certificates, it remains too early to say whether
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nonperformance, and the party has taken steps to mitigate
damages.238 Overall, the Council’s issuances of the force majeure
certificates serve as shields to protect Chinese companies at the
expense of the other parties in the global supplies network.239
Even though the certificates are likely to protect these Chinese
companies, there will be international consequences on the
opposing parties; the “spillover” effects will punish other
countries that are not at fault for the pandemic’s effect on these
contracts.240
CONCLUSION
Contracts are relationships between parties. Through a
long and storied history of development, contract law percolates
to reflect how parties handle emergencies caused by deaths, wars,
epidemics, and government actions. These doctrines prevent
governments, either the judicial or executive branch, to rewrite the
contracts. Though in the time of the pandemic, some governments
may prefer expediency to rewrite contracts for the parties. The
short-term action, however, undermines the core principles
underlying the freedom to contract that parties have bargained for
when they enter contracts. Government interventions, in the name
of certainty and expediency, actually may cause uncertainty and
generate mistrust in future contracts and undermine the resiliency
of contract law as emergency law. Parties are best served to
anticipate future pandemic and government actions by drafting
better contracts to reflect the new normal.
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